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Abstract: 
Two experiments examined the relations among adult aging, mind wandering, and executive-task 
performance, following from surprising laboratory findings that older adults report fewer task-
unrelated thoughts (TUTs) than do younger adults (e.g., Giambra, 1989 and Jackson and Balota, 
2012). Because older adults may experience more ability- and performance-related worry during 
cognitive tasks in the laboratory, and because these evaluative thoughts (known as task-related 
interference, “TRI”) might be sometimes misclassified by subjects as task-related, we asked 
subjects to distinguish task-related thoughts from TRI and TUTs when probed during ongoing 
tasks. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults completed either a go/no-go or a vigilance 
version of a sustained attention to response task (SART). Older adults reported more TRI and 
fewer TUTs than did younger adults while also performing more accurately. In Experiment 2, 
subjects completed either a 1- or a 2-back version of the n-back task. Older adults again reported 
more TRI and fewer TUTs than younger adults in both versions, while performing better than 
younger adults in the 1-back and worse in the 2-back. Across experiments, older adults' reduced 
TUT rates were independent of performance relative to younger adults. And, although older 
adults consistently reported more TRI and less mind wandering than did younger adults, overall 
they reported more on-task thoughts. TRI cannot, therefore, account completely for prior reports 
of decreasing TUTs with aging. We discuss the implications of these results for various 
theoretical approaches to mind-wandering. 
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1. Introduction 
Young adults spend, on average, a third to half of their daily lives thinking about something 
other than their current activity (Kane et al., 2007, Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010, Klinger and 
Cox, 1987–1988 and McVay et al., 2009). Unfortunately, these task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) 
can sometimes result in “absentminded” mistakes (e.g., McVay et al., 2009, Reason, 1990, 
Schooler et al., 2004 and Smallwood et al., 2004). Mind wandering is thus a frequent, yet 
occasionally costly, experience. It also occurs more frequently for some people than others: 
college students who have poorer cognitive-control abilities, such as those with lower working 
memory capacity (WMC; Kane et al., 2007, McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 
2012a) and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AD/HD; McVay et al., 2008 and Shaw and 
Giambra, 1993), report more TUTs during challenging tasks than do people with better control 
abilities. 
 
1.1. Mind wandering and adult aging 
As we age, then, does the propensity to mind-wander increase? Do TUTs account, in part, for 
older adults' performance deficits in many tasks involving cognitive control? Based on age-
related decline in many domains, including WMC (see Craik & Salthouse, 2008), and on 
theoretical accounts that propose deficits in goal maintenance or attentional inhibition to explain 
age differences in executive control (e.g., Braver and West, 2008 and Hasher and Zacks, 1988), 
we might expect that older adults are often mind wandering. For example, the Braver–West view 
claims that older adults have difficulty maintaining task-related goals to intentionally guide 
actions; an age-related inability to keep task-irrelevant information from becoming conscious (as 
TUTs) should thus disrupt active maintenance or accessibility of task goals, thereby leading to 
errors. Indeed, Hasher and Zacks originally theorized that such impaired inhibition is the root of 
much age-related variance in cognition (see Hasher et al., 2007 and Hasher et al., 1999). 
 
Counter to this prediction, however, and in contrast to most WMC-related findings with younger 
adults (e.g., Kane et al., 2007 and McVay and Kane, 2009; but see Levinson, Smallwood, & 
Davidson, 2012), older adults actually report less frequent TUTs than do younger adults ( 
Giambra, 1989, Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–91 and Jackson and Balota, 2012; Krawietz, 
Tamplin, & Radvansky, in press). The negative correlation between age and mind-wandering 
rate was first established via retrospective questionnaires (e.g., Giambra, 1977–78 and Singer 
and McCraven, 1961), and may have reflected age-related memory or metacognitive deficits, or 
a reporting bias. To demonstrate aging's effect on mind wandering in a controlled setting, 
Giambra (1989) measured TUTs during a laboratory vigilance task with instructions aimed to 
encourage reporting and to limit self-censure. Across five experiments, older adults reported 
fewer TUTs than did younger adults. 
 
Giambra's (1989) findings are surprising from the perspective that aging impairs executive 
control and that executive-control failures predict TUTs. Indeed, Giambra discussed these results 
as contradicting the Hasher and Zacks (1988) view that older adults have decreased inhibitory 
ability. Giambra argued, instead, that TUTs represent trains of thoughts, or “unfinished 
business,” which come to a conclusion during unconscious processing and then require 
attentional capacity to enter awareness. In other words, when performing a task that does not 
require full attention, excess attentional capacity can be devoted to mind wandering. 
Accordingly, younger adults should experience more TUTs than should older adults because 
they have more attentional capacity and more often an excess to allow TUTs. Giambra further 
explained, however, that his tasks were designed to allow plenty of attentional capacity to spare 
(supported by ceiling-level performance), and proposed that older adults have less “unfinished 
business” than do younger adults, leading to fewer and less urgent unconscious thoughts. 
 
1.2. Executive processes in mind wandering 
Giambra (1989) thus foreshadowed a current debate about the role of executive resources in 
TUTs. The Smallwood and Schooler (2006) theory of mind wandering characterizes TUTs as 
requiring the resources typically used for executive control (see also Teasdale et al., 1995), with 
evidence drawn from studies showing that: (1) tasks imposing greater cognitive loads reduce 
TUT rates (e.g., Antrobus, 1968, Teasdale et al., 1993 and Teasdale et al., 1995) and, conversely, 
practice-driven automaticity increases TUT rates (e.g., Mason et al., 2007 and Teasdale et al., 
1995); (2) executive-control brain networks, along with “default mode” networks, are active 
during mind wandering (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009); (3) in-
the-moment TUT reports predict performance errors, suggesting competition for a unitary 
processing capacity (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2004); (4) individual differences in control 
capabilities may be positively associated with TUT rates during very simple tasks, such as breath 
monitoring, indicating that people with more available resources use them to mind-wander 
(Levinson et al., 2012, but see McVay and Kane, 2012a and McVay and Kane, 2012b). 
 
McVay and Kane (2010a), in contrast, propose a “control failures × current concerns” view that 
takes the opposite stance on the role of executive capacity: the contents of TUTs are 
automatically and continuously generated unconsciously in response to environmental cues to 
subjects' current concerns and goals (following Klinger, 1971, Klinger, 1999 and Klinger, 2009), 
similar to Giambra's concept of “unfinished business.” Cued TUTs then enter awareness as a 
result of an executive-control failure, as opposed to the availability of excess capacity. Their 
main sources of evidence were: (1) TUTs predict performance deficits on attention-demanding 
tasks (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, McVay et al., 2009 and Smallwood et al., 2004), which may 
indicate that TUTs enter awareness when control falters, rather than when there is capacity to 
spare; (2) contexts that impair control abilities, such as fatigue (e.g., Antrobus et al., 1966, 
McVay and Kane, 2009, Smallwood et al., 2004 and Smallwood et al., 2005; Teasdale et al., 
1995) and inebriation (Finnigan et al., 2007 and Sayette et al., 2009), increase TUTs; (3) 
individual differences in control are negatively associated with TUT rates during demanding 
tasks (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, McVay and Kane, 2012a, McVay and Kane, 2012b and 
Shaw and Giambra, 1993); (4) subjects who have greater attention control suffer as much 
performance cost as those with poorer control on occasions when they experience TUTs, in 
conflict with a resource-availability view that predicts spare resources to minimize dual-tasking 
costs.1 
 
Giambra's (1989) findings of TUTs decreasing with age seem to fit more comfortably with the 
executive-resource view of mind wandering than the control failures × concerns view. Older 
adults, who have reduced WMC (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005) and poorer attention control (e.g., 
Cohn et al., 1984, Hamm and Hasher, 1992, Hartley, 1993, Spieler et al., 1996 and West and 
Baylis, 1998), should experience more control failures than should younger adults. If control 
failures drive mind-wandering, then older adults should mind-wander more frequently. Thus, 
older adults' reduced rate of mind-wandering seems to suggest, instead, that they have 
insufficient resources to maintain TUTs in the face of simultaneous tasks. Given the potential 
importance of aging findings to general theories of mind-wandering, we thought it necessary to 
confirm and expand on Giambra's results. In the current study, we improve upon Giambra's 
methods and address an alternative explanation for the age-related differences in TUTs he found. 
 
1.3. Age differences in mind-wandering: methodological and theoretical considerations 
Although Giambra's (1989) laboratory studies improved upon retrospective surveys of mind-
wandering tendencies, he asked subjects whether they had experienced any TUTs during 25–30 s 
task periods, a long enough delay to allow forgetting or confabulation. In our studies, as is now 
common (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), we further reduced retrospective biases by probing 
subjects randomly throughout the task and having them report on their immediately preceding 
thoughts. In addition, Giambra's vigilance tasks yielded ceiling performance, which prevented 
assessment of TUT–performance associations (which bears on whether TUTs draw on executive 
resources). The current studies kept performance below ceiling to allow tests of whether in-the-
moment costs of TUTs were similar across age groups. 
 
While we were conducting the current studies, both Jackson and Balota (2012) and Krawietz et 
al. (in press) similarly reported age-related decreases in TUTs. Moreover, they did so using 
random, in-the-moment thought probes (like ours) during variations of a go/no-go task (the 
“sustained attention to response task” [SART]; Jackson & Balota, 2012) or reading 
comprehension tasks (Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., in press). Although Jackson and 
Balota did not assess age differences in the consequences of TUTs for performance, Krawietz et 
al. reported that both older and younger adults were similarly inaccurate in answering reading 
comprehension questions following TUT reports versus on-task-thought reports; moreover, 
Krawietz et al. found age differences in TUT rates within tasks that yielded either no age 
differences in accuracy (Experiment 1) or significant age differences in accuracy favoring 
younger adults (Experiment 2). A growing body of data thus points consistently to reduced TUT 
rates in older versus younger adults, regardless of age differences in corresponding task 
performance. 
 
The primary purpose of our study was to test an alternative explanation for age differences in 
TUT rates by probing for a particular thought category. In our previous young–adult work 
(McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a), subjects reported not only on-task 
thoughts versus TUTs, but also evaluative thoughts about their performance (e.g., “I'm good at 
this!”; “I'm screwing up.”), or so-called “task-related interference” (TRI; e.g., Smallwood et al., 
2004; see also Mikulincer and Nizan, 1988 and Sarason, 1988). TRI differs conceptually from 
TUTs because it is, in a sense, task-related; however, TRI experiences are also not quite “on-
task,” or directly about the task stimuli or demands, either. TRI is also empirically 
distinguishable from both TUTs and on-task thoughts. On one hand, TRI and on-task thoughts 
both decline with time on go/no-go tasks, while TUTs increase (McVay and Kane, 2009 and 
McVay and Kane, 2012a). On the other hand, TRI and TUTs are similarly associated with higher 
in-the-moment go/no-go errors than are on-task reports (McVay & Kane, 2012a). Note that the 
control failures × concerns view argues that mind-wandering propensity reflects an interaction of 
control abilities and the cuing of personal goal-related concerns. Although typical laboratory 
contexts, with computer equipment and young–adult researchers in campus buildings, are less 
likely to cue many of the personal goals for older adults (i.e., their present-oriented, relationship-
related goals; Carstensen, 1993 and Carstensen, 1995), they may trigger other, non-goal-related, 
concerns about their cognitive abilities and potential intellectual decline (e.g., Hertzog & 
Hultsch, 2000). Thus, unless subjects are asked about TRI (and they have not been in prior aging 
studies; Giambra, 1989 and Jackson and Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., in press), we cannot know 
whether older adults actually experience less off-task thought than do younger adults. 
 
Here, we tested whether apparent age differences in TUTs stem from subjects misclassifying 
TRI. That is, older adults may experience increased TRI (see Parks, Klinger, & Perlmutter, 
1988–89), but may also misclassify TRI as “on-task” thoughts because of forced-choice, on- 
versus off-task reporting. At least occasionally, subjects may classify performance-evaluative 
thoughts as “on-task” because they are more task-related than are TUTs about romantic getaways 
or dinner plans. If older adults experience elevated TRI, due to stereotype threat (Hess et al., 
2003 and Rahhal et al., 2001) or concerns about cognitive decline (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000), 
and if TRI has similar behavioral consequences to TUTs (McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay 
and Kane, 2012a), then misclassifications of TRI as on-task thoughts should result in older adults 
appearing more task-focused and less distracted than are younger adults. Moreover, if older 
adults actually experience fewer TUTs, and yet increased TRI, relative to younger adults, it 
strains any resource-based explanation of age differences in off-task thought: if older adults' 
reduced TUT rate is due to deficient resources, then they ought to engage in little TRI-type 
thinking, as well. Finally, if age differences in TUT reports were largely caused by older adults' 
inability to assess their subjective experiences (a concern not yet directly tested in the literature), 
then older adults should show similarly low rates of TUTs and TRI. 
 
Both Jackson and Balota (2012) and Krawietz et al. (in press) reported several findings that 
underscore the need to distinguish TUT from TRI when assessing age differences. First, in the 
Jackson–Balota study, older adults showed increased post-error slowing – where response times 
were longer following incorrect than correct responses – which may reflect TRI (see also 
Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009). Second, the older subjects tested by Jackson and 
Balota had higher conscientiousness scores than the younger subjects, indicating a general 
propensity to care about performing well; they also indicated higher levels of interest in the 
SART (see also Germain & Hess, 2007), consistent with the older subjects tested by Krawietz et 
al., who reported greater interest in the reading task than did the younger adults. Such age 
differences in interest and conscientiousness could lead to more TRI experiences for older than 
for younger adults in the laboratory. Again, if people frequently misclassify TRI experiences as 
on-task thoughts, then age-related difference in thought reports might misrepresent the extent to 
which older adults engage in TUTs. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
In both Experiments 1 and 2 we assessed TRI, a form of off-task thought that may be especially 
relevant to older adults and may be sometimes misclassified. We also analyzed age differences in 
the effects of TUTs on performance in several executive-control tasks, as a potential means to 
distinguish resource-consuming views of mind wandering (Giambra, 1989 and Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2006) from the control failures × concerns view (McVay and Kane, 2010a and McVay 
and Kane, 2010b). Experiment 1 presents a manipulation of the SART, where some subjects 
performed a standard, go/no-go version requiring cognitive control (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), in the form of inhibiting habitual responses (withhold response to 
rare targets), while other subjects performed a less executive, non-inhibitory “vigilance” version 
(respond to rare targets). Our “vigilance SART” conceptually replicates Giambra's (1989) task, 
whereas the standard SART: (a) seems to require executive control over habitual responding; (b) 
is more commonly used in recent mind-wandering research (e.g., Jackson and Balota, 2012, 
McVay and Kane, 2009 and Smallwood et al., 2004), and; (3) shows that TUTs predict errors at 
the level of occasions (errors occur when TUTs occur) and individuals (people who TUT often 
err often). Because McVay and Kane (2012a) found that the executively demanding go/no-go 
version of the SART elicited WMC-related variation in task performance and TUT rates, 
whereas the vigilance version yielded null WMC effects in both, we tested here whether similar, 
selective patterns would emerge for age differences in performance and thoughts. 
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Subjects 
One hundred and eight adults between ages 18 and 28 (M = 19.3, 69% female) and ninety-nine 
adults between ages 60 and 75 (M = 66.9, 74% female) participated. All were prescreened for 
basic health issues and all had good corrected visual acuity (20/50 or better). We recruited 
younger adults from the UNCG Psychology research pool, who received credit towards a course 
requirement, and older adults from the Greensboro, NC area, who earned $30. Table 1 presents 
demographic and basic cognitive measures. 
Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of subject characteristics. 
 
Experiment 1 
Measure YoungStandard YoungVigilance OldStandard OldVigilance 
Education 12.85 (0.18) 12.98 (0.20) 15.22 (0.39) 15.62 (0.36) 
Medicationa 0.66 (0.18) 0.77 (0.16) 2.39 (0.27) 2.64 (0.33) 
Vocabularya 28.05 (0.44) 28.26 (0.48) 33.63 (0.47) 34.20 (0.44) 
Digit symba 60.62 (1.32) 63.65 (1.82) 51.14 (1.89) 50.40 (1.73) 
DS memorya 7.93 (0.19) 7.67 (0.23) 5.80 (0.31) 5.92 (0.33) 
 
Experiment 2 
Measure Young1-back Young2-back Old1-back Old2-back 
Education 12.41 (0.11) 12.70 (0.15) 15.58 (0.38) 15.00 (0.42) 
Medicationa 0.70 (0.14) 0.82 (0.16) 2.35 (0.25) 3.12 (0.34) 
Vocabularya 27.96 (0.43) 27.84 (0.47) 33.86 (0.43) 33.05 (0.56) 
Digit symba 61.76 (1.49) 62.21 (1.25) 49.00 (1.81) 46.14 (2.04) 
DS memorya 7.65 (0.25) 7.59 (0.23) 5.23 (0.38) 4.93 (0.37) 
Note. Education = number of years of education completed; medication = self-reported number 
of medications taken daily; vocabulary = number of correct answers out of 40 on the Shipley 
Vocabulary Test (Zachary, 1986); digit symb = WAIS Digit-Symbol subtest (Wechsler, 1981); 
DS memory = symbol recall following the WAIS Digit-Symbol subtest (Wechsler, 1981); 
standard = subjects completing the standard, go/no-go, version of the SART; vigilance = subjects 
completing the vigilance version of the SART; 1-back = subjects completing the 1-back task; 2-
back = subjects completing the 2-back task. 
 
a Age comparison p < .05. No comparisons of, or interactions with, the task-condition variables 
were significant. No statistical comparison of education was made because the young adults were 
currently enrolled at a university. 
2.1.2. Design and materials 
The design was a 2 × 2 factorial model, with age group (younger, older) and SART type 
(standard, vigilance) as between-subjects factors. We modified the standard and vigilance 
SARTs from previous mind-wandering studies of younger adults (McVay and Kane, 2009 and 
McVay and Kane, 2012a). 
 
Both SARTs serially presented 900 words: each was centered for 350 ms and followed by a 900 
ms mask. We instructed subjects to respond with a key-press to either frequent non-target words 
(animal names) or to infrequent target words (foods; 11% of trials). In the standard (go/no-go) 
SART, subjects responded to frequent non-targets by pressing the spacebar and to infrequent 
targets by withholding response. The frequency of ‘go’ stimuli thus built up a habitual response 
that had to be suppressed on target no-go trials. In contrast, the vigilance SART, where subjects 
responded only to infrequent targets, did not generate a “go” prepotency to be controlled. The 
first 10 (unanalyzed) trials presented non-targets; remaining trials comprised four seamless 
blocks, each presenting 225 trials consisting of 45 words repeated five times in a different 
random order. Five target words appeared randomly within each set of 45 trials; different targets 
appeared in each block. Thought probes followed 60% of the targets, yielding 60 probes over a 
20 min task. 
 
Thought probes presented a screen asking, “What were you just thinking about?” with seven 
response options (McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a). Subjects were to report 
what they were thinking just before the probe appeared, and were instructed at length about these 
response choices: (1) the task: thinking about the stimulus words or appropriate response; (2) 
task experience/performance: evaluating one's performance; (3) everyday things: thinking about 
recent or impending events; (4) current state of being: thinking about conditions such as hunger 
or sleepiness; (5) personal worries: thinking about ongoing concerns or troubles; (6) daydreams: 
fantasies disconnected from reality; or (7) other. During the task, probes presented only the 
numbers and italicized category names; subjects pressed the corresponding number key. For 
analysis, responses of (1) were coded as on-task thoughts, (2) as TRI, and (3)–(7) as TUTs. 
Instructions attempted to minimize bias against TUT reporting by stressing the normalcy of off-
task thoughts during such tasks: 
 
“During the task, you may find yourself thinking about something other than the task. We 
are interested in what types of things people think about during a task like this (and 
during other kinds of tasks). In order to examine this, the computer will periodically ask 
you what you were *just* thinking about. It is perfectly normal to think about things that 
are not related to the task, and to have different kinds of thoughts during different kinds 
of tasks. We will give you several categories of things that people might think about 
during a task like this. Please try your best to honestly assess your thoughts and choose a 
category that best describes your thoughts at the time when we ask.” 
 
We conducted this experiment using Dell desktop computers with 17-inch LCD monitors and E-
Prime 1.2 software. Stimuli were black against a white background, in 18-point Courier-New 
bold font. 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of 1–6, with cubicle partitions between them. Before completing 
the SART, all subjects provided informed consent and demographic information, had their visual 
acuity tested, completed a brief cognitive battery (see Table 1 for tests and results), and then 
completed a source memory task (part of an unrelated project). These activities took 
approximately 1 hour to complete. We offered all subjects a break before the SART. 
Experimenters read all on-screen SART instructions aloud to subjects. Subjects completed 10 
practice SART trials before seeing thought-probe instructions. 
2.2. Results 
We report non-directional null-hypothesis significance tests with alpha = .05 and partial eta 
squared (ηp2) as an effect-size estimate. 
2.2.1. Thought content 
Here we addressed our primary question: Do younger and older adults differ in either TUTs or 
TRI? We also assessed whether our two SART versions elicited different rates of TUTs and TRI 
experiences, and whether off-task thoughts were predicted by local changes in performance (i.e., 
reaction time; RT). 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, subjects reported a higher proportion of TUTs on the vigilance SART 
than on the standard SART, F(1, 203) = 11.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, and, consistent with previous 
findings, older adults reported fewer TUTs than younger adults on both SART versions, F(1, 
203) = 125.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .38. Age group did not interact with SART type (F < 1). In 
contrast, and as predicted, older adults reported more TRI than did younger adults, F(1, 
203) = 10.21, p < .01, ηp2 = .05 (see Fig. 2), and both groups reported more TRI in the standard 
than the vigilance SART, F(1, 203) = 29.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .13; again, age group and SART 
version did not interact (F < 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Mean proportion of TUT reports, by SART type (standard, vigilance) and age (younger 
and older adults) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. Note: TUT = task-
unrelated thought. 
 
Fig. 2. Mean proportion of TRI reports, by SART type (standard, vigilance) and age (younger 
and older adults) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. Note: TRI = task-related 
interference. 
Previous SART studies have demonstrated an RT speed-up prior to TUT versus on-task reports 
(McVay and Kane, 2009 and Smallwood et al., 2004) by comparing the average RT from the 
four non-target trials directly preceding TUT reports to those preceding on-task reports; these 
pre-TUT speed-ups are sometimes interpreted as reflecting attentional lapses and “mindless” 
responding (but see McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a). Using standardized 
RTs from the standard SART to account for general slowing in older adults (Jackson & Balota, 
2012), we conducted a thought type × age mixed ANOVA, which indicated a main effect of 
thought type, F(2, 170) = 4.91, p = .008, ηp2 = .06. As illustrated in Fig. 3A, subjects responded 
more quickly leading up to a TUT report than an on-task thought report, F(1, 
85) = 11.84p = .001, ηp2 = .12, and more quickly leading up to a TRI report than an on-task 
thought report, F(1, 85) = 4.12p = .045, ηp2 = .05, but with no difference between TUTs and 
TRI (F < 1). We found no main effect of age (F < 1) and no interaction of thought type and age 
(F < 1). 
 
Fig. 3. Mean “go” RTs (to non-target trials in the standard SART) leading up to a thought report 
(TUT, TRI, or TASK; panel A) or to a target trial (error or correct; panel B), standardized to 
account for general slowing due to age, in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Note: TUT = task-unrelated thought; TRI = task-related interference; TASK = on-task thoughts. 
2.2.2. SART performance 
Here we tested for performance differences in accuracy and RT across two SART versions, 
while determining whether any age- or task-related differences would parallel those we found in 
subjects' thought reports. We also tested whether standard-SART errors were either predicted or 
followed by RT changes (i.e., speed-ups before errors; slow-downs after errors), because both 
have been argued to reflect off-task thinking. 
As in previous SART research (McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a), we 
calculated a signal-detection sensitivity score for each subject using the formula for logistic 
distributions (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988): dL = ln{[H(1 − FA)] / [(1 − H)FA]}, and a CL score, 
representing bias, using:CL = 0.5[ln{[(1 − FA)(1 − H)] / [(H)(FA)]}], where ln = natural log, H = 
hit proportion, and FA = false-alarm proportion. We adjusted individual hit or false-alarm rates 
of 0 and 1 by .01. Overall, subjects' accuracy (dL) was higher in the vigilance than in the standard 
SART, F(1, 203) = 132.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .39 (see Fig. 4). Also as expected, a “go” bias 
(i.e., CL < 0) was elicited by the standard SART (M = − 2.14) and a “no-go” bias (CL > 0) by 
the vigilance SART (M = 0.62), F(1, 203) = 1044.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .84. Contrary to our 
intentions of using executive tasks that would elicit age-related deficits in performance, older 
adults showed higheraccuracy (dL) than did younger adults on both SART versions, F(1, 
203) = 8.02, p < .01, ηp2 = .04, and age did not interact with SART type, F(1, 
203) = 1.63, p = .20, ηp2 = .008. The age groups did not differ in bias (CL), F(1, 
203) = 1.36, p = .25, ηp2 = .01, and, again, age did not interact with SART type, F(1, 
203) = 2.49,p = .12, ηp2 = .012. 
 
Fig. 4. Mean signal-detection sensitivity (dL) by SART type (standard, vigilance) and age 
(younger and older adults) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Because RTs were assessed on different trial types across SART versions (frequent no-go trials 
in standard SART; rare go trials in vigilance SART), we analyzed age differences separately by 
SART type. Older adults were slower than younger adults to respond correctly in standard SART 
(Ms = 469 and 425 ms);t(102) = 2.44, p < .05, but not in vigilance SART (Ms = 628 and 
615 ms); t(100) = − .95, p = .34. Because prior studies have found that individual RT variability 
(i.e., subjects' RT standard deviations) covaries with TUT rate, we calculated it for each subject 
on non-target “go” trials in the standard SART ( McVay and Kane, 2009, McVay and Kane, 
2012a and McVay and Kane, 2012b); RT variability did not differ between age 
groups, t(102) < 1. 
As in previous SART studies, we examined pre-error speeding in the standard go/no-go SART 
(e.g., Jackson and Balota, 2012, McVay and Kane, 2009, McVay and Kane, 2012a, Robertson et 
al., 1997 and Smallwood et al., 2004) by comparing the average RT from the four non-target 
trials directly preceding a target error (i.e., responding to a no-go target) to those directly 
preceding a correct withholding of response. Some researchers have argued that such pre-error 
speeding is reflective of “mindless” habitual responding, and thus may provide a behavioral 
marker of mind-wandering (e.g. Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood, McSpadden, Luus, & 
Schooler, 2008; but see McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a). Using 
standardized RTs (see Fig. 3B), we found a main effect of accuracy, whereby subjects responded 
more quickly leading up to an error than to a correct target trial, F(1, 100) = 11.23, p < .001, η
p2 = .61. There was no main effect of age (F < 1), but, in contrast to our prior analysis of pre-
TUT-report RTs, age interacted with accuracy, F(1, 100) = 4.41, p = .04, ηp2 = .04. Although 
both older and younger adults were faster on the non-target trials leading up to an error than a 
correct response [t(52) = 8.60, p < .001; t(49) = 10.95, p < .001], younger adults had a greater 
disparity between their RTs prior to an error versus a correct response (Mdifference = .55) than 
did older adults (M difference = .39). 
To examine post-error slowing in standard SART (see Fig. 5), which may be a behavioral 
manifestation of self- or performance-referential thoughts (i.e., TRI; Jackson & Balota, 2012), 
we analyzed standardized RTs on non-target trials after correct and incorrect targets that did not 
precede thought probes (which affect RTs). We found that main effects of accuracy and age were 
not significant, but age group interacted with accuracy,F(1, 100) = 10.31, p = .002, ηp2 = .09. 
Consistent with our prediction that older adults would experience more TRI than would younger 
adults, older adults slowed down after committing errors, t(48) = − 1.97, p = .055, but younger 
adults actually sped up, t(52) = 2.58, p = .013. 
 
Fig. 5. Mean “go” RTs (to non-target trials in the standard SART) following a non-probe 
target trial (error or correct), standardized to account for general slowing due to age, in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
2.2.3. Mind wandering and performance 
Here we tested, first, whether individual differences in overall TUT rate predicted aspects of 
SART performance in either or both versions of the task (as they typically do within samples of 
young–adult subjects; e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009 and McVay and Kane, 2012a). We then 
assessed whether TUT or TRI experiences, in the moment, were associated with committing an 
error on either or both SARTs (again, as they typically are within samples of young–adult 
subjects). 
SART performance was associated with TUTs. Regarding individual differences, overall TUT 
rates correlated negatively with standard SART dL (r = − .25) and positively with intra-subject 
RT variability (r = .31), even after partialing age (rs = − .23 and .38, respectively). In the 
vigilance SART, as well, TUT rate correlated with dL (r = − .28) and with intra-subject RT 
variability on target trials (r = .24), but only intra-subject RT variability was significantly 
correlated with TUT rate after partialing age (r = .27). When TUT was included as a covariate in 
the age group × SART type ANOVA on performance (dL), the main effect of age on 
performance was no longer significant (F < 1), indicating that older adults outperformed younger 
adults in the SART due, at least in part, to their reduced TUT rate. When TRI was included as a 
covariate, in contrast, the main effect of age was still significant, F(1, 202) = 6.67, p = .01, η
p2 = .03. 
Within subjects, we calculated the in-the-moment accuracy associated with TUTs and TRI 
experiences. An age group × SART type × thought type (TUT, TRI, and on-task) mixed 
ANOVA on target accuracy yielded no main effect or interactions involving age (all Fs < 1). 
However, a main effect of thought type, F(2, 336) = 40.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, indicated that 
subjects were more likely to report TUT or TRI than on-task thoughts on error trials. Thought 
type also interacted with SART type, F(2, 336) = 8.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. Follow-up contrasts 
indicated that in the standard SART, TUTs and TRI were both associated with worse 
performance on targets than were on-task thoughts, F(1, 83) = 50.57, p < .001, η
p2 = .38; F(1,83) = 38.15,p < .001, ηp2 = .32, but they were not different from each other 
(F < 1). Subjects were accurate on 57% (SD = 29%) of target trials when they reported on-task 
thoughts, but only 32% accurate (SD = 30%) when reporting a TUT and 35% accurate 
(SD = 26%) when reporting TRI. In the vigilance SART, TUTs and TRIs were, again, both 
associated with worse performance on targets than were on-task 
thoughts, F(1,87) = 23.87,p < .001, ηp2 = .22, and F(1, 87) = 3.89, p = .05, ηp2 = .04, 
respectively. But, unlike in the standard SART, TUTs were associated with worse performance 
than was TRI, F(1, 87) = 6.17, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. Subjects were accurate 89% (SD = 20%) of 
the time when they reported on-task thoughts but only 78% accurate (SD = 24%) when reporting 
TUTs and 84% accurate (SD = 26%) when reporting TRI. 
2.3. Discussion 
As expected, TRI explained some age-related differences in reporting off-task thoughts. Older 
adults experienced more TRI than did younger adults, but TRI did not account entirely for the 
difference between younger and older adults' off-task thinking. Younger adults reported 21% 
TRI and 51% TUT, for a total of 72% off-task thoughts, while older adults reported 31% TRI 
and 17% TUT, for a total of 48% off-task thoughts. In previous studies, the absence of TRI as a 
response choice may have inflated age differences in TUT rate by categorizing older adults' TRI 
reports as on-task thoughts. In the current study, though, older adults still reported more on-task 
thoughts and fewer TUTs than did younger adults. 
 
Mind wandering was equally detrimental to older and younger adults, conflicting with Giambra's 
(1989) prediction that TUTs occur when there is attentional capacity to spare, as well as with one 
reasonable interpretation of the executive-resource view of Smallwood and Schooler (2006; but 
see Smallwood, 2010). Both views propose that resources are divided between task and TUTs, 
and so, by resource-theory logic (e.g. Norman & Bobrow, 1975), performance of individuals 
with fewer resources to divide (e.g., older adults) should be impacted more when TUTs occur 
(but see footnote 1). This was not the case. 
 
Following Jackson and Balota (2012), we also analyzed age differences in post-error slowing on 
the standard SART. Here, again, older adults slowed more following errors than did younger 
adults. Although subjects' degree of slowing did not correlate with their probed TRI rates (r = − 
.10, p = .92), post-error slowing may nonetheless represent another indication of increased 
attention to performance evaluation by older adults (Jackson & Balota, 2012). We recommend 
that future studies assess thought content when post-error slowing occurs to test explicitly 
whether such slowing is connected to TRI experiences. 
 
There is a notable limitation to Experiment 1: older adults outperformed younger adults on both 
versions of the SART. Jackson and Balota (2012) and others (e.g., Carriere, Cheyne, Solman, & 
Smilek, 2010) have also recently reported better accuracy for older than for younger adults on 
the standard SART. Older adults' superior accuracy was likely due to a speed–accuracy tradeoff 
in all of these studies, as they responded much more slowly than did younger adults. The 
standard SART, in particular, benefits from slow responding, which allows time to catch errant 
habitual responses by overcoming the prepotent action (McVay & Kane, 2012a). So, although 
our finding is not an outlier, the lack of performance differences between ages prevents us from 
assessing TUTs' contributions to cognitive-control declines in aging, and from evaluating the 
paradox of older adults' control deficits in the context of reduced TUTs. Indeed, if anything, our 
ANCOVA results from Experiment 1 indicate that older adults' propensity for on-task thoughts 
helps to reduce their performance deficits relative to younger adults (i.e., younger adults' deficit 
in SART accuracy was not significant after accounting for their increased TUT rate). For 
Experiment 2, then, we chose a task known to elicit age differences in performance, the n-back 
task (e.g., Dobbs and Rule, 1989 and Vaughan et al., 2008). 
 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 attempted to replicate the age differences we found in TUTs and TRI during 
go/no-go and vigilance SARTs, but in an n-back task of working memory (e.g., Gevins et al., 
1990, Kirchner, 1958 and Mackworth, 1959) that should yield significant age-related deficits in 
performance. The n-back requires subjects to decide whether each stimulus in a sequence 
matches the one presented n items ago. n-Back tasks generally show age differences for ns of 2 
or higher (e.g., Missonnier et al., 2004 and Vaughan et al., 2008). Here we compared TUT and 
TRI rates in older and younger adults, and tested for thought–performance associations, during 
1-back versus 2-back tasks. As in Experiment 1, then, we contrasted two similar tasks that 
nonetheless differed in cognitive-control demands, to test whether age-related differences in 
TUTs might depend on age-related differences in performance (but see Krawietz et al., in press). 
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Subjects 
One hundred and twelve younger adults between ages 18 and 29 (M = 19.0, 71% female) and 85 
older adults between ages 60 and 75 (M = 67.4, 64% female), who had not participated in 
Experiment 1, participated. We screened, recruited, and compensated subjects the same way as 
in Experiment 1 (for characteristics, see Table 1). 
 
3.1.2. Design and materials 
The design was a 2 × 2 factorial model, with age group (younger, older) and memory load (1-
back, 2-back) as between-subjects factors. The n-back task required subjects to respond overtly 
only when the current stimulus matched the stimulus presented “n” trials ago. Stimuli were 
twelve 1-syllable, 4- or 5-letter, semantically unrelated words (corn, fence, green, guard, jump, 
large, month, name, push, star, tape, waive); subjects pressed the space bar only when they 
identified targets. In the 1-back task, targets matched the immediately preceding word and, in 2-
back, targets matched the word presented prior to the immediately preceding word (e.g., in corn–
green–corn, the second corn is the target). Targets appeared on 25% of the trials. Each n-back 
task also presented lures – 3-back matches in both tasks (e.g., corn–green–jump–corn), 2-back 
matches in the 1-back task (e.g., corn–green–corn), and 1-back matches in the 2-back task (e.g., 
green–corn–corn) – on 21% of trials. A word never appeared simultaneously as a target and lure. 
To minimize perceptual recognition, we varied the location of consecutive words in one of three 
vertical positions in a repeating sequential order (Oberauer, 2005). 
 
Both n-back tasks presented ten blocks of 48 words but this block structure was not apparent to 
subjects. Each block presented 12 targets and 10 lures. Each word was presented for 500 ms and 
followed by a fixation cross for 2500 ms, allowing 3000 ms for response. Every block contained 
thought probes following two target trials and one lure (alternating between 3-back and 1- or 2-
back lures) for a total of 30 probes over a 25-minute task. Stimuli appeared in black against a 
white background, in 36-point Courier-New bold font. We used the same computer hardware and 
software as in Experiment 1. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Subjects performed the same pre-n-back activities as in Experiment 1, and were again tested in 
groups of one to six. Experimenters read all on-screen n-back instructions aloud. Subjects 
completed 40 practice n-back trials (10 targets) before seeing the thought-probe instructions from 
Experiment 1. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Thought content 
As in Experiment 1, our key question was whether younger and older adults differed in either 
TUTs or TRI. We also assessed whether our two n-back tasks elicited different TUT and TRI 
rates (i.e., whether memory load moderated any of our thought-content findings). 
Fig. 6 illustrates that older adults again exhibited lower TUT rates than did younger adults, F(1, 
192) = 175.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, and that subjects reported more TUTs in the 1-back than in 
the 2-back task, F(1, 192) = 11.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .06; although older adults reported fewer 
TUTs than did younger adults in both tasks, the age group × memory load interaction 
approached conventional significance, F(1, 192) = 3.33, p = .07, ηp2 = .02. Younger adults 
reported more TUTs in the 1-back than in the 2-back,t(109) = 3.77, p < .001, but older adults did 
not differ between tasks, t(83) = 1.12, p = .27. As indicated in Fig. 7, TRI reports showed a 
different pattern. Older adults, as in Experiment 1, reported more TRI than did younger 
adults, F(1, 192) = 14.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, and subjects reported more TRI during the 2-back 
than the 1-back, F(1, 192) = 12.13, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. Furthermore, age group interacted with 
memory load, F(1, 192) = 6.86, p < .01, ηp2 = .03, such that older adults reported more TRI 
than younger adults in 2-back,t(97) = − 4.04, p < .001, but not in 1-back, t(95) = − 1.06, p = .29. 
 
Fig. 6. Mean proportion of TUT reports, by n-back memory load (1-back, 2-back) and age 
(younger and older adults) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. Note: TUT = 
task-unrelated thought. 
 
Fig. 7. Mean proportion of TRI reports, by n-back memory load (1-back, 2-back) and age 
(younger and older adults) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. Note: TRI = 
task-related interference. 
3.2.2. n-Back performance 
In order to test whether our Experiment 2 manipulation of executive-control requirements was 
more successful in producing age differences than was Experiment 1, we examined accuracy and 
RT differences between our two n-back versions, while also determining whether any age or 
memory-load differences in performance would parallel those we found in subjects' thought 
reports. 
Target accuracy was better on the 1-back than on the 2-back task, F(1, 193) = 139.73, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .42, and although accuracy did not differ between older and younger adults (F < 1), age 
group interacted with memory load, F(1, 193) = 9.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. In 1-back, older 
adults identified more targets than did younger adults (M proportions = .98 and .95, 
respectively), t(95) = − 2.66, p < .01, but in 2-back, younger adults identified more targets than 
did older adults (Ms = .88 vs. .85), t(97) = 1.99, p = .05. Similarly, for lure accuracy, age group 
and memory load produced main effects and an interaction. Younger adults committed fewer 
false alarms on lures overall, F(1, 192) = 8.66, p = .004, ηp2 = .04, and subjects committed 
fewer false alarms on the 1-back than on the 2-back, F(1, 192) = 183.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .49. 
There was also a significant interaction of age group and memory load on lure accuracy, F(1, 
192) = 13.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. In the 1-back task, older and younger adults correctly rejected 
lures equally well (Ms = .97 and .96), t(95) = − 1.27,p = .21, but in 2-back, younger adults 
correctly rejected more lures (M = .83) than did older adults (M = .74),t(97) = 3.53, p = .001. On 
non-lure trials, subjects had more false alarms in the 2-back than in the 1-back,F(1, 
192) = 27.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, but older and younger adults did not differ, F(1, 
192) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .01, and age group did not interact with memory load (F < 1). 
We calculated signal-detection sensitivity (dL) and bias (CL) scores for each subject as we did for 
the SART. As indicated in Fig. 8, accuracy was higher in the 1-back than in the 2-back, F(1, 
192) = 274.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .59. Older adults and younger adults performed equally well, 
overall, F(1, 192) = 1.80, p = .18, ηp2 = .01, but these main effects were modified by a 
significant interaction, F(1, 192) = 23.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. In 1-back, older adults performed 
better than younger adults (Ms = 7.40 and 5.92), t(95) = − 3.87,p < .001, but in 2-back, younger 
adults (M = 3.15) outperformed older adults (M = 2.30), t(97) = 2.98, p = .004. A “non-
response” bias (CL > 0) was elicited by both n-back tasks (M = 0.28); bias did not differ by 
memory load, F(1, 192) = 3.47, p = .06, ηp2 = .02, or age group, F(1, 192) = 2.95, p = .09, η
p2 = .02, and memory load and age group did not interact, F(1, 192) = 2.73, p = .10, ηp2 = .01. 
Overall then, our 2-back task elicited the expected age difference in performance favoring young 
adults, while still demonstrating older adults to mind-wander less frequently than younger adults. 
(Analyses of RTs indicated overall slowing for older adults, but did not suggest any speed-
accuracy trade-offs that might complicate interpretation of the age differences we found in n-
back accuracy.2) 
 
Fig. 8. Mean signal-detection sensitivity (dL) by n-back memory load (1-back, 2-back) and age 
(younger and older adults) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
3.2.3. Mind wandering and performance 
Here we tested for both individual-differences and in-the-moment associations between TUTs 
and n-back performance. Regarding individual differences, TUT rates correlated negatively with 
1-back accuracy (r = − .37) and dL (r = − .50), and positively with intra-subject RT variability to 
1-back targets (r = .22). With age partialed out, TUTs correlated negatively with 1-back accuracy 
(r = − .27) and dL (r = − .37), but not RT variability (r = .16; p = .13). In 2-back, as well, TUT 
rate predicted accuracy (r = − .19), but not dL (r = − .15;p = .13) or RT variability (r = .07). With 
age partialed out, TUTs correlated negatively with 2-back accuracy (r = − .43), dL (r = − .46), 
and positively with RT variability (r = .23). 
When TUT was included as a covariate in the age group × memory load ANOVA on 
performance (dL), the interaction of age and memory load was still significant, F(1, 
191) = 20.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. In the 1-back task, as in the SART in Experiment 1, the main 
effect of age group (favoring older adults) was no longer significant when TUT was included as 
a covariate (F < 1), suggesting that older adults performed more accurately because they were 
more task-focused than younger adults. In 2-back, the main effect of age group was still 
significant when TUT was included as a covariate, F(1, 96) = 33.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .26, 
indicating an effect of age above and beyond the relationship of TUTs with performance — this 
makes sense because, unlike Experiment 1, older adults performed worse here than did younger 
adults while having more on-task thoughts. When TRI was included as a covariate, the 
interaction of age and memory load was still significant, F(1, 191) = 24.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, 
as was the main effect of age in both the 1-back and 2-back tasks, F(1, 94) = 13.81, p < .001, η
p2 = .13, and F(1, 96) = 6.73, p = .01, ηp2 = .07, respectively. 
Regarding in-the-moment associations of TUTs and TRI with target accuracy, an age 
group × memory load × thought type (TUT, TRI, on-task) mixed ANOVA indicated a main 
effect of thought type, F(2, 228) = 15.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .12: accuracy was worse when 
subjects reported TUTs or TRI versus on-task thoughts. Thought type also interacted with 
memory load, F(2, 228) = 3.37, p = .04, ηp2 = .03. Follow-up contrasts revealed that in 1-back, 
only TUTs were associated with worse performance on targets than were on-task thoughts, F(1, 
60) = 16.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. TRI did not differ significantly from on-task thoughts,F(1, 
60) = 2.40, p = .13, ηp2 = .04, although, numerically, TRI and TUTS were very similar: 
compared to 95% (SD = 10%) target accuracy for on-task reports, subjects were accurate on 90% 
(SD = 23%) of trials when reporting TRI and 89% (SD = 13%) when reporting a TUT. In 2-
back, both TUTs and TRI were associated with worse performance on targets than were on-task 
thoughts, F(1, 70) = 19.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .22;F(1,70) = 8.75, p = .004, ηp2 = .11, but they 
were not different from each other, F(1, 70) = 1.66, p = .20, ηp2 = .02. Subjects were accurate 
79% (SD = 19%) of the time when reporting on-task thoughts but only 65% (SD = 24%) when 
reporting a TUT and 69% (SD = 28%) when reporting TRI. TUTs and TRIs seemed equally 
detrimental to subjects' performance on target trials in the 2-back task. Age did not interact with 
thought type,F(2, 228) = 2.14, p = .12, ηp2 = .02. 
The n-back task also allowed us to attach thought probes to designated lure trials, as well as to 
targets. Given that off-task thinking is associated with relatively shallow processing of external 
stimuli (e.g.,Smallwood et al., 2011), we questioned whether mind-wandering episodes might 
make subjects especially vulnerable to responding on the basis of familiarity, leading to 
commission errors to lure stimuli. An age group × memory load × thought type (TUT vs. on-
task) mixed ANOVA on lure accuracy, however, indicated no main effect of thought type, F(2, 
148) = 1.91, p = .15, ηp2 = .03, nor any interactions with age group or n-back (Fs < 1). TUT 
experiences were associated only with misses, and not with false alarms to lures. 
3.3. Discussion 
Older adults reported fewer TUTs than did younger adults during both n-back tasks, while 
demonstrating the predicted performance deficit in 2-back. Thus, older adults may exhibit 
executive-control difficulties despite relatively infrequent mind wandering. Also consistent with 
Experiment 1, older adults reported greater TRI than did younger adults, but here only during the 
more difficult 2-back task. Younger adults reported 58% TUTs and 13% TRI, for a total of 71% 
off-task thoughts, while older adults reported 16% TUTs and 24% TRI, for a total of 40% off-
task thoughts. The findings confirm, again, that older adults mind-wander less than do younger 
adults, even when TRI is taken into account. 
 
Younger adults outperformed older adults on both target (omission errors) and lure trials 
(commission errors) in the 2-back task. Older adults were also slower to respond, but unlike the 
SART, where slowing helps subjects stop more effectively on no-go trials, slowing here did not 
aid accuracy. As in Experiment 1, TUTs negatively affected performance, in the moment, 
equally for older and younger adults. The equivalent impact of TUTs on performance between 
younger and older adults' does not seem to support the view that those with less attention to spare 
– older adults in this case – are especially hurt by TUTs. 
 
4. General discussion 
The current experiments expanded upon previous aging and mind-wandering studies. First, we 
used randomly occurring probes to assess immediately preceding thoughts, rather than 
predictable probes to assess thought content over 20–30 s periods (cf. Giambra, 1989), as a way 
to reduce contributions of retrospective-memory deficits in older adults. Second, we probed for 
an additional category of thought, TRI (cf. Giambra, 1989 and Jackson and Balota, 2012; 
Krawietz et al., in press). TRI reflects self- and performance-evaluative thoughts and thus might 
be important when testing older adults in the laboratory. Both experiments indicated that older 
adults report fewer TUTs than do younger adults, even after accounting for their elevated TRI. 
 
4.1. Task-related interference 
As we predicted, older adults reported more TRI than did younger adults. TRI does not map 
directly onto on-task thoughts or TUTs, but stands alone as a separate type of thought. TRI is 
task-related, like on-task thoughts, but was associated with performance deficits, similar to 
TUTs. Unlike TUTs, however, TRI was only associated with errors in the more difficult tasks – 
standard SART and 2-back – but not vigilance SART or 1-back. Finally, age differences in TRI 
were in the opposite direction to those in TUTs, with older adults reporting more TRI 
experiences but fewer TUTs. Self-evaluative thoughts may thus be similar to the compensatory 
strategies older adults use in response to awareness of age-related deficits (e.g., Dixon, de Frias, 
& Backman, 2001), although here we found no evidence that TRI experiences aid performance. 
 
Although we suggest that age differences in TRI are important to laboratory-based studies of 
executive control and thought content, we do not know whether they also reflect age-related 
thought differences in everyday contexts. When older subjects choose to spend time participating 
in the laboratory and younger subjects participate as a course requirement, variables like task 
novelty, environmental novelty, task interest, and task-elicited effort, are likely to differ between 
age groups. Indeed, Jackson and Balota (2012) and Krawietz et al. (in press) found that older 
subjects expressed more interest in their lab tasks than did younger subjects. Moreover, anxiety 
about being compared directly to younger adults, a form of stereotype threat that will be specific 
to laboratory contexts (Hess et al., 2003 and Rahhal et al., 2001), may trigger intrusive thoughts 
about task performance for older adults. Thus, laboratory tasks should provoke age differences in 
TRI that may be more subtle, or largely nonexistent, in daily life. 
 
4.2. Aging, mind-wandering reports, and performance 
Multiple and diverse findings of reduced TUTs with age may seem puzzling in light of age-
related declines in executive control (see Braver and West, 2008 and Hasher et al., 2007). 
However, some of the previous aging studies of mind wandering did not systematically examine 
the association between thought and performance because their tasks elicited age equivalence in 
performance (Giambra, 1989 and Jackson and Balota, 2012; but see Krawietz et al., in press). 
Here, the seemingly paradoxical result, that older adults mind wander less often than do younger 
adults, persisted even in the 2-back task where younger adults outperformed older adults. This 
finding suggests that the entry of TUTs into awareness is not a primary cause of age-related 
declines in performance on executive tasks like 2-back. Furthermore, we assessed age 
differences in the relationship of TUTs with task performance. As in previous studies, analyses 
of both the overall TUT rate and in-the-moment analysis of TUTs and errors revealed a negative 
association between TUTs and accuracy. Importantly, the current studies showed that this 
relationship is the same for younger and older adults, and so TUTs were not differentially costly 
for older adults, in contrast to what executive-resource accounts would seem to predict 
(Giambra, 1989, Smallwood and Schooler, 2006 and Teasdale et al., 1995). 
 
One potential criticism of our (and others') methods is that subjects may have reported TUTs as a 
reaction to a recent error, rather than as a valid report of their thought content (note that this 
explanation cannot handle well the replicable associations between TUT rate and RT variability; 
McVay and Kane, 2009, McVay and Kane, 2012a and McVay and Kane, 2012b). However, in 
the n-back task, we examined in-the-moment thought reports attached to both target and lure 
trials and found that TUTs were associated with only target misses rather than lure false alarms. 
This distinction adds validity to the thought probe method in that, if subjects were simply 
reacting to all their errors by reporting TUTs, rather than genuinely reporting their thought 
content, TUT reports should have followed both types of error. Furthermore, in the standard 
SART, TUTs accompanied errors on “false alarm” trials and so the particular response or error 
type does not distinguish the impact of TUTs on performance. 
 
Finally, regarding thought-report validity, we must consider whether older adults consistently 
report few TUTs because meta-consciousness (e.g., Schooler, 2002) is altered with aging, an 
issue that has not been sufficiently addressed in previous studies of aging and mind-wandering. 
That is, older adults may be less able to monitor, assess, or remember their own subjective 
experiences, and so they may fail to perceive and report the TUTs they actually had throughout 
the task. Although this hypothesis warrants direct investigation in future mind-wandering work, 
the metacognition literature indicates that older adults are just as able to monitor their memory-
encoding experiences as are younger adults (e.g., Hertzog and Dunlosky, 2011, Hertzog et al., 
2002 and Robinson et al., 2006). Moreover, we see several direct indications that our older 
adults' thought reports were as valid as our younger adults' and thus were not compromised by 
meta-awareness deficits. First, older adults reported frequent TRI experiences, and so they were 
not reluctant to report some forms of off-task thought. Second, younger and older adults' 
accuracy rates were similarly associated with thought reports in both experiments, with more 
errors preceding TUT and TRI reports than preceding on-task thought reports. Third, older and 
younger adults both sped up similarly on the trials preceding TUT reports in the standard SART. 
Fourth, in both experiments, the pattern of response latencies to thought probes were similar for 
older and younger adults: subjects in both age groups reported on-task thoughts more quickly 
than TRI experiences, which in turn were reported more quickly than TUTs (standardized RTs, 
collapsed across tasks: Experiment 1 younger adults' Ms = − .106 ± .743, .056 ± .536, and .370 ± 
.431, respectively; Experiment 1 older adults' Ms = .027 ± 1.011, .422 ± 1.231, and .878 ± .868, 
respectively; Experiment 2 younger adults' Ms = − .172 ± .755, .182 ± .709, and .282 ± .472, 
respectively; Experiment 2 older adults' Ms = − .327 ± .249, .401 ± .793, and 1.015 ± .887, 
respectively). If older adults were unable to report on their own subjective experiences, we 
would not expect them to be so similar to younger adults in their associations between thought 
reports and accuracy rates, thought reports and pre-target RTs, and latencies to report different 
categories of thought. 
 
4.3. Implications for mind wandering theory 
Although Giambra's resource-sharing view of mind wandering, where subjects divide their 
attentional capacity between task performance and TUTs (see also Smallwood and Schooler, 
2006 and Teasdale et al., 1995), explained reduced TUTs in older adults, it cannot explain the 
associations among age, TUTs, and performance reported here. If, as capacity views suggest 
(e.g., Norman and Bobrow, 1975 and Posner and Boies, 1971), subjects divide available 
resources between tasks (here, between on- and off-task thoughts), and if younger adults have 
more resources available to divide, then it follows that younger adults should be less affected by 
TUTs than should older adults (see footnote 1). In contrast, we found that TUTs had the same 
detrimental effect on younger and older adults' performance (and this same pattern holds for 
higher vs. lower WMC younger adults; McVay & Kane, 2010a). 
 
Otherwise, an age-related decline in TUTs appears consistent with a resource view of mind 
wandering, at least at first glance, as aging has been hypothesized to reduce cognitive resources 
(e.g., Craik & Byrd, 1982). By this view, older adults report fewer TUTs because they do not 
have the available resources to entertain task-irrelevant thoughts. This explanation only works, 
however, until one considers age-related increases in TRI. Unless TRI-type thoughts can be 
demonstrated to require fewer cognitive resources than do TUTs, and we see no reason to think 
that they should (indeed, they seem to be equivalently associated with performance deficits in the 
moment), we probably should not appeal to reduced resources to explain the age-related decline 
in mind-wandering experiences.3 
 
Given these limits to resource views (see also Navon, 1984), a new framework for understanding 
age differences in TUTs seems necessary. Indeed, Smallwood and colleagues recently proposed 
an alternative to resource-based theories of mind wandering (Smallwood, 2010 and Smallwood, 
in pressSmallwood et al., 2011). Their “global availability/perceptual decoupling” view grows 
out of global workspace conceptions of consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1988, Dehaene et al., 1998, 
Navon, 1989a and Navon, 1989b). According to these views, the broadcasting of goal-relevant 
information to the cognitive system can bring its specialized modules under widespread 
executive control of that globally available (and verbally reportable) information. The global 
availability/perceptual decoupling theory argues that mind-wandering experiences result when 
the broadcast workspace is occupied – in an all-or-none fashion – by off-task, internally 
generated representations. The attentional system thus becomes decoupled from its externally 
oriented, perceptual analysis of the outside world, resulting in minimal sensory analysis. 
Although Smallwood and colleagues continue to couch this theoretical approach in resource 
language, it lacks the defining features of a resource theory. That is, the theory argues clearly 
that the global workspace projects either on-task or off-task representations to the cognitive 
system, rather than acting as a divisible capacity that can be apportioned flexibly between 
externally and internally focused mentation. 
 
Whatever the merits are of this novel theoretical approach, we know of no research suggesting 
age-related changes in the extent or quality of verbally reportable, or globally available, 
experiences, and so the theory does not make as clear predictions about age-related differences in 
mind wandering as did the original Smallwood and Schooler (2006) resource view. Indeed, to the 
extent that maintaining global availability to goal-relevant representations reflects a form of 
executive control, Smallwood's view might seem to predict that populations with executive-
control deficiencies, such as older adults, would also be especially likely to mind-wander [see, 
e.g., Smallwood (2010) regarding WMC-related individual differences in TUT rate]. With that 
said, Smallwood and colleagues argue that people with superior executive abilities should mind-
wander more than should those with inferior executive abilities, at least during tasks that are easy 
enough to allow excess executive resources to be devoted to TUTs (e.g., Levinson et al., 2012). 
 
The fact that TUTs decrease with adult age also appears problematic for our control failures × 
concerns theory (McVay and Kane, 2010a and McVay and Kane, 2010b): older adults often 
exhibit impaired cognitive control (Braver & West, 2008) and so they should be particularly 
susceptible to the TUT intrusions. However, our view considers not only the influences of 
executive control on mind wandering, or we would simply refer to it as a “control failures” 
theory. Instead, we posit interacting influences of control processes and interference, in the form 
of cue-driven, off-task thoughts about personal concerns.4 The “control” factor reflects the 
ability of executive-control processes to maintain ready access to task goals and suppress TUTs 
(and other forms of distraction) before they enter awareness and disrupt goal maintenance. The 
“concerns” factor reflects the extent to which the environment cues a current concern and 
thereby interferes with ongoing-task goals (Klinger, 1971, Klinger, 1999, Klinger, 2009 and 
Singer, 1975). We consider the automatic cuing of off-task thoughts as analogous to an 
experimental manipulation of interference within a task, such as during Stroop tasks where 
incongruent color-words disrupt responding relative to neutral words: increased control 
processing is required to maintain task goals when there is more competing information provided 
by off-task thoughts cued by the environment. In fact, when the environment is manipulated to 
elicit more (or more urgent) current concerns (Antrobus et al., 1966, Horowitz and Becker, 1971 
and Horowitz et al., 1971), subjects report more TUTs. Age differences in TUTs, therefore, 
should be viewed as an interaction of reduced control processes and the generation and cuing of 
concern-related, off-task thoughts. 
 
By this view, older adults may have fewer TUTs than younger adults because they are less likely 
to produce off-task thoughts in response to the contextual cues available in a laboratory setting. 
For example, socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 1993 and Carstensen, 1995) 
explains age differences in the types of goals and current concerns people hold. Older adults' 
goals tend to involve close relationships and emotional well-being, whereas younger adults 
profess more novelty-seeking and accomplishment-oriented goals. Few of older adults' social or 
emotional goals are likely to be cued while sitting with an unfamiliar undergraduate in front of a 
flat panel LCD screen. That is, the college campus setting, with bustling hallways, high-tech 
computer workstations, and young student experimenters, is more likely related to the goals and 
current concerns of the undergraduate population, and so the typical context for aging studies is 
less likely to trigger current-concern-related TUTs in older subjects (McVay and Kane, 2010a 
and McVay and Kane, 2010b). With that said, note that older adults' increased TRI reports are 
consistent with a concerns view: although TRI experiences may not reflect older adults' general 
life concerns outside the laboratory, they do seem to reflect contextually primed concerns about 
intellectual aging (e.g., Sindi et al., 2012). They thus provide mixed support for the control × 
concerns view: older adults do report more off-task thought related to performance concerns than 
do younger adults, but older adults' TRI still does not rise to the frequency level of younger 
adults' TUT reports. Future research will be needed to determine whether cuing additional, 
personally relevant concerns for older adults will bring their total off-task thinking rate to the 
level of younger adults. For example, if familiar objects from older adults' homes or lives (e.g., 
family portraits, keepsakes, print newspapers) were incorporated into the experimental setting, 
particularly those that might activate socioemotional goals, it may help overcome the concern-
related cue disparity in the laboratory between older and younger adults. Alternatively, an 
exploration of TUTs within the daily life and routines of older adults, but without the 
dependence on retrospective reports, such as with an experience-sampling method (e.g., Kane et 
al., 2007, Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010, Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988 and McVay et al., 2009) 
may reveal a different pattern of age differences than do laboratory studies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Two experiments addressed the possibility that age-related differences in TUTs were due to 
misclassifications of TRI experiences, and confirmed the finding that older adults mind wander 
less than do younger adults during ongoing laboratory tasks (Giambra, 1989 and Jackson and 
Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., in press). We suspect that the age difference in TUTs derives from 
differential cuing of concern-related, interfering thoughts, and our TRI findings support this, but 
further research is needed to more fully address this possibility. If the interference from off-task 
thoughts is somehow equated between younger and older adults, by analogy to aging studies 
where task demands are manipulated to equate performance across ages, we suspect that older 
adults would be less able than younger adults to exert cognitive control to keep those thoughts 
out of awareness. 
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1 According to a view that mind-wandering episodes draw on general executive resources and 
that tasks that require more resources allow for less mind wandering, McVay and Kane, 2012a 
and McVay and Kane, 2012b argued that it should also follow that the performance of people 
with more resources available should be less affected by mind-wandering than should that of 
people with fewer resources available. Someone with more resources should be able to dedicate 
more of them to two simultaneous activities (task performance and maintaining TUTs) than 
should someone with fewer resources (e.g., Norman and Bobrow, 1975 and Posner and Boies, 
1971). However, we acknowledge that resource theories are generally flexible enough – indeed, 
often to the point of unfalsifiability – to allow for multiple, if not contradictory, predictions (see 
Navon, 1984). For example, one might claim that ongoing task performance should be hurt 
equally for people with more and with fewer resources because those with more resources will 
engage in more complex, resource-intensive TUTs than might those with fewer resources. 
2 Age group and memory load exerted main effects on target RTs. Older adults were 
significantly slower (M = 771 ms) than were younger adults (M = 680 ms), F(1, 193) = 12.15, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .06, and RTs to 2-back targets were slower (M = 814 ms) than to 1-back targets (M 
= 622 ms), F(1, 193) = 53.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .22; the age group × memory load interaction was 
marginally significant, F(1, 193) = 3.34, p = .07, ηp2 = .02, whereby older adults slowed to a 
greater degree of slowing in the 2-back task. In the analysis of standardized RTs to account for 
age-related slowing, however, older adults' marginally greater slowdown to 2-back versus 1-back 
trials was not significant, F < 1. For raw RTs to lure trials, only memory load exerted a main 
effect: Erroneous responses to 2-back lures (M = 966 ms) were slower than to 1-back lures (M = 
841 ms), F(1, 187) = 8.84, p = .003, ηp2 = .05. Older adults and younger adults responded to 
lures with similar RTs, F < 1, and age group did not interact with memory load, F(1, 187) = 2.52, 
p = .11, ηp2 = .01; standardized RT analyses yielded a similar non-significant age interaction 
with memory load, F < 1. 
3 The same logic applies to TUT rates varying with task demands in the present study (i.e., 
during the less demanding tasks in Experiments 1 and 2 – vigilance SART and 1-back – versus 
the more demanding tasks — standard SART and 2-back). On one hand, the easier tasks, which 
should consume fewer resources than the harder tasks, also elicited higher TUT rates, seemingly 
consistent with the claim that TUTs depend on resource availability. But, again, on the other 
hand, this framework is unhelpful in explaining the TRI data, because the higher-demand tasks 
also produced the higher TRI rates. Without positive evidence that TRI and TUT experiences 
vary in resource demands, we cannot explain task-related variability in both by appeal to 
resource theory. 
4 Smallwood's global availability/perceptual decoupling view (Smallwood, 2010 and Smallwood 
et al., 2011) similarly emphasizes the influence of “default system” goal-related activity on 
thought content. 
